tv Key Capitol Hill Hearings CSPAN September 11, 2015 5:00pm-7:01pm EDT
in the middle east to avoid more mistakes by the same people who gave you the disastrous iraq war. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman's time has expire thsmed egentleman from wisconsin. mr. ryan: i yield three minutes to a distinguished member of the ways and means committee, mr. kelly of pennsylvania. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman is recognize for three minutes. mr. kelly: i thank think chairman. -- i thank the chairman. this is a horrible deal. you never get what you deserve in a deal, you get what you negotiate. let me give you a contract between what two presidents say when they talk about deals. president obama said it's either this agreement or war. president reagan said there's no argument over the choice between peace and war. but there's only one guaranteed way you can have peace and you can have it in a second. surrender. now i want you to let your mind drift back to 14 years ago on the morning very eerily like today where america awoke and some americans were going off
to work in the world trade center. some americans were going off to work in the pentagon. and some americans boarded flights for destinations that they thought they were going to get. to 3,000 americans said good-bye that morning to their families and their loved ones, thinking they would see them again. never knowing that they would never be able to say that again, would never be able to kiss them good-bye, would never again celebrate a birthday or any other meaningful event in their life because of an act of terrorism. flight 93, and by the way, it 37 united flight 93, with passengers and seven crew members boarded an airplane destinned for san francisco. that is not where the plane landed. that plane is embedded in a smoldering cratering in the peaceful countryside of shanksville, pennsylvania, because of terrorists. the members of that flight crew
and those passengers performed the greatest act of religious sacrifice that you can do. they gave up their lives for the lives of their fellow americans. they walked away from a future filled with promise and decided it was more important at that moment to sacrifice themselves. how in the world can we sit in america's house and i speak to you today not as a republican but as an american. my friends, as we let our eyes fill with tears over the great loss that day, and as our ears pick up on the message from our enemies in the east, death to israel, death to the great satan, death to america, let us resound with love and strength and say listen never again, never again, never again. let those words echo forever and ever.
not only in your ears but in your heart. do not cave in. do not sacrifice the safety, the security, and the stability of 330 million americans for the legacy of one man. that is not who we are. that is not who we've ever been. and that's not who we will ever be. my friends, and i mean sincerely my friends and my fellow americans, vote against the greatest betrayal we have ever seen in this country. this is not a deal that protects america. it is unenforceable, unverifiable. this is a horrible deal. mr. chairman, thank you so much. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman's time has expired. the gentleman from michigan. minute n: i pause for a . i now yield two minutes to the
gentleman from texas, mr. doggett. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman is recognized for two minutes. mr. doggett: as the last speech indicates, it is hardly by chance that the house republican leadership has scheduled these votes on 9/11. votes on a proposal, an agreement, to prevent iran from developing a nuclear weapon ever. the justifiable fear of another terrorist attack and the justifiable outrage about the terrorist attack of 9/11 have been exploited before today. they were exploited to justify the disastrous invasion of iraq. while few americans today will recall that actually after 9/11, there was some early support in iran against al qaeda terrorism, few can forget the of the repeated and rather
deceitful warning that promoted the rush to war in iraq. we don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud. nce again, the specter of this mushroom cloud is being raised with those who would interfere with an international diplomatic success. an agreement that would avoid putting us on another path to war. and the same kind of folks that urged us to rush into baghdad are the same folks that told us back before we even had this agreement that it wouldn't work and we ought to begin bombing in tehran and the surrounding area. who said it will only take a few days of bombs and it'll all be over. the same poor logic that took us into a disaster in iraq that cost so many families. the ultimate sacrifice and the waste of over $1 trillion.
this is not a debate about the trinh towers. t is -- about the twin towers. it is a debate that would be a twin wrong if we follow the same approach we took last time. i've supported sanctions against iran. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman is recognize for 30 seconds. mr. doggett: supported them at each opportunity. but this is not about sanctions. this is about a last ditch effort to undermine a diplomatic victory. those who reject this victory, are weak on alternatives. they talk about a secret, the biggest secret is what they would do other than bomb first and ask questions later. he director of the mossad, the israeli c.i.a. said we're putting in place a verification system which is second to none and has no precedent. ultimately, reason will prevail this week in congress the president will be sustained, and families here and in israel will be safer.
i yield back. . the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from wisconsin. i yield two minutes to the gentleman from new york, mr. reed. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from new york is recognized for two minutes. mr. reed: thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, chairman, for yielding. i listened to this debate. i read this agreement. and i heard my colleague from illinois say something that resonates with me. we should listen. first and foremost, we should listen to the american people. they are overwhelmingly saying this is dangerous, reject this deal. let's listen to the leaders that say this puts us in more jeopardy of going to war. we all want peace. there's not a human being in america that wants to go to war, and to classify us on this
side of the aisle as having a esire to go to war, shame. you get peace through strenk and you need to put the -- through strength and you need to put the american citizens first. what about our four fellow american citizens that are sitting in iranian jail right now and the president said we tried to negotiate it but they wouldn't talk to us? well, then you walk away. at about the families that are represented in the $47 billion worth of judgments that have been filed against iran because they suffered terrorist acts at the hands of iran? and we're going to give $150 billion to iran without paying those fellow american citizens, those families who suffered and lost their loved ones? stupidity. american citizens always must be first. iran has made no confusion --
raised no confusion as to what its intention is here. it wants a nuclear weapon. it wants to destroy israel. it wants to destroy america. listen to their own words, and if you do, we would say we want peace but it will be on our terms from a position of strength. vote no on this deal. nd i yield back. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from. mr. levin: i yield to another member of our committee, mr. crowley of new york. mr. crowley: i like mike, i admire him but i think he is it a disservice to the house and this debate to bring up the issue of 9/11. i do thank him for his honesty to say this is all about, having this debate today and this vote today to stir the emotions of the american people. my emotions always start on this day. 14 years ago i knew people who
died that day. my cousin died. my friends died. i don't need to be reminded of that but it will not cloud my decisionmaking on this important issue. today i stand in support of a joint comprehensive plan of action. this has been a difficult decision for me and i know it's been for many of my colleagues as well. there are those who came out against this deal before you even read it. for those that took the time to read the agreement and came to a given conclusion, you have my deep and profound respect because we both share the same goals. but after carefully studying this agreement, i believe it is important to give diplomacy the opportunity to succeed. the agreement takes important steps to address iran's nuclear program. under this agreement, both the current unirain yum and plutonium paths to a bomb -- uranium and plutonium paths to
a bomb is put to rest and it will be centralized in a single facility that is pen trabble by u.s. -- penetrateable by u.s. airpower and it does not constrain the united states by bolstering our allies and by pushing back iran's other nefarious activities. there is more we can do and must do including strengthening israel, jordan and our other allies in the region. israel is the only country being threatened with annihilation. i know that. o it needs and deserves a quat -- quantitative and qualitative military advantage. and if this deal doesn't work or iran's leadership somehow gets the idea that they can attack us or wipe out our friends, the united states and our allies will have the capability, the will and the power to confront iran's nuclear program and destroy it.
we have the best military in the world. we have the best intelligence service in the world. and america will always be prepared. the fact is no one here can predict whether iran will give up its program, not republicans nor democrats, and if they tonight, we have options. but we can do this and give this plan the opportunity to work, and i am prepared to do that. now, after all this discussion and talk about bipartisanship, a real profile of courage would be for one of you to support your president. one republican to stand and support your president. 13 -- i ask for an additional 30 second. levin letch i yield one minute. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman is recognized for one minute. mr. crowley: 13 years ago i stood in the house of representatives and i gave the benefit of the doubt to the
then president and he took us to war. i will give today the benefit of the doubt to your president to take us to peace, and with that, mr. speaker, i yield back the balance of my time. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman -- the gentleman from wisconsin. mr. ryan: at this time i'd like to yield a minute to the distinguished member from the ways and means committee, the gentleman from texas, mr. brady. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from texas is recognized -- will the entleman restate -- one minute . the gentleman is recognized. mr. brady: thank you, mr. speaker. i didn't take an oath of office to defend my president. i took an oath of office to defend my country. the world is a dangerous place and nothing makes it more dangerous than a nuclear armed iran. versus t a republican democrat issue. this is truth versus false. i read the agreement.
i studied it. you have to ask yourself three key questions. does it stop iran's nuclear capability for the long term? no. does it stop the spread of nuclear weapons in the middle east? no. more importantly, does this make america and our allies, like israel, safer? no. even supporters believe that to be true. no. america deserves, israel deserves, our world deserves an agreement that dismantles iran's nuclear capability, not just delays it for a small while, at best. that's why i oppose this agreement. it makes our country and our allies at risk. that's why i support stopping the president, suspending the president from lifting the sanctions in this agreement. i yield back. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from michigan. mr. levin: could the speaker indicate how much time there is on both sides? the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from michigan has 8 1/2 minutes remaining. the gentleman from wisconsin has 12 3/4 minutes remaining. mr. levin: i'll reserve. the speaker pro tempore: the
gentleman reserves. the gentleman from wisconsin. mr. ryan: at this time, mr. speaker, i'd like to yield two minutes to the gentleman from illinois, a distinguished member of the ways and means committee, mr. dold. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from illinois is recognized for two minutes. mr. dold: thank you, mr. speaker. i want to thank the chairman for yielding. and i've had an opportunity to listen to the debate and some of the things going on, yes, they're heated, but as we look at this agreement, historic agreement -- my good friend from new york just asked, will you stand with your president? i have stood with the president before, but i think it's also important that we take a look at this agreement. this is an historic mistake. this is one that will jeopardize the safety and security of the united states. and i want to echo that this is a bipartisan opposition, so this is not about left versus right. this is about right versus wrong. and ultimately when i tuck my children in bed at night, a 13-year-old and 11 yorlede and 8-year-old and i look in the faces of those that are here, these young americans and i
wonder what type of country they will inherit with a nuclear-armed iran, for me that is unacceptable. our stated objectives, our goals were to make sure that iran never has the ability to achieve a nuclear weapon, and yet this agreement, according to bob menendez, all but preserves it. a nuclear-armed iran, one that shouts "death to america," they want to wipe israel off the face of the map, this agreement, ballistic missile embargo is lifted in eight years and arms embargo in five, my friends, what do you use a ballistic missile for? i would argue it's not to drop leaflets, it's not for humanitarian purposes, it is to rain terror down on the united states of america. and for me that is completely unacceptable. and, again, i don't care where you come from, what district you're in. this is about, will we be safer, and the answer is simply no. i believe that this agreement ultimately will be an arms race
in the middle east. we talked about france. we talked about the u.k. we've talked about germany. has anybody asked the neighborhood, the saudi arabia, the u.a.e., egypt or israel? the answer is no because they're uniformerly against this because they know iran's ultimate goal is to not only devastate that region but to devastate the united states of america. this is one of the things that, again, must unite us. this is not about partisanship. mr. ryan: i give the gentleman another 30 seconds. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman is recognized for an additional 30 seconds. mr. dold: this is not about partisanship. please hear me. we don't want to bring up 9/11 in the sense we want to do it on this day, 9/11, but i do think it smacks the idea we never want to see that dirty bomb that comes into a containership, that goes into new york or miami or washington, d.c., because you know what, no one wants to relive what happened on that day 14 years ago. and yet if we do not step up in a united front and stop this,
my fear is that we will relive that day again. that for me is unacceptable, and i implore you all, my colleagues, my friends, to stand up against this awful, historic mistake. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from michigan. mr. levin: i'll reserve. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman continues to reserve his time. the gentleman from wisconsin. mr. ryan: at this time i yield two minutes to the distinguished chairman of the budget committee, member of the ways and means committee, mr. price. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from georgia is recognized for two minutes. mr. price: thank you, mr. speaker. this week iran's supreme leader ayatollah khamenei, the person who president obama and his administration said reached agreement and doubled down and declared the united states the great satan and he said, quote, after negotiations there will be nothing left of israel in 25 years and then jihaddi more
alwill not leave a moment of -- morale will not leave a moment of sirenity. this is who the president of the united states say he's blindly trusting. this is -- there are no anytime, anyplace inspections. there's no accountability for past iranian nuclear activities. conventional armament bans will be lifted. ballistic missile bans will be lifted. and to put it plainly, mr. speaker, this agreement paves a shiny yellow brick road to death and destruction around the world, not to mention an unprecedented nuclear arms race across the entire middle east. we should have made sure that not a single resource or benefit received by iran funds islamic terrorism. we should have made sure that iran publicly accept israel's right to exist. that genocide is unacceptable, that stated goals of wiping entire groups of people and nations off the earth is
unacceptable. and at the very least, we should have made certain that four american hostages, including a christian pastor, being held in iran were released. of course not a single one of these objectives were achieved. the administration thought that compelling iran to renounce nuclear holocaust or islamic terrorism or genocide were simply far too unreasonable to request. if this deal goes through, time will surely demonstrate that it will be a shameful stain in the history of the world. now, we pray that terrible ramifications do not come to fruition. however, if past is prologue, this agreement may very well make any further action or concerns voiced by anyone too little too late. a nuclear iran spells nothing but disaster for safety at home and abroad. this agreement must be rejected. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from michigan. mr. levin: i yield 2 1/2 minutes now to the gentleman from illinois, a distinguished member of our committee, mr.
davis. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from illinois is recognized for 2 1/2 minutes. mr. davis: thank you, mr. speaker. and i thank the gentleman for yielding. after listening to this debate, i commend president obama and secretary kerry for their leadership in crafting the joint comprehensive plan of plus reached twheep p-5 one nations and iran. i do so because this is a plan which promotes peace and security not war or a continuous threat of war. yes, no agreement is perfect and no agreement will fully satisfy everyone but i can tell you that for me and the constituents of the seventh district of illinois, we say let's give peace a chance.
we say, let's support the position of our president. but we also say, let's support the position of our experts. let's support the position of our allies. let's heed the words of the prophets who say come and let us reason together. we shall all be utterly -- or we shall all be utterly destroyed by the edge of the sword. so yes, we say let's support the most rational, the most logical, the most comprehensive, and the most effective path to peace that we know. and yes, it's not about supporting the position of any single individual. but it's about supporting what is good for america.
it is about supporting what a good to help stabilize our world. so we can exist with the idea that peace is indeed possible and war is not inevitable. yes, i support the president nd i yield back. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from wisconsin. mr. ryan: at this time i yield one and a half minutes to the distinguished member from nebraska, mr. smith. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman is recognized for one and a half minutes. mr. smith: mr. speaker, i rise today in strong opposition to lifting economic sanctions on iran. throughout august, i spoke with many nebraskans all across my district at public meetings, in addition to their frustration over the reach of the federal government, the most common concern they shared with me involved the iran deal. the ramifications of this agreement will impact not only
our country's future but also, i believe, the stability of the world. i'm opposed to this deal and believe congress must reject it and allow u.s. negotiators to go back to the table. permanently lifting economic sanctions on iran as this deal does would allow global financial resources to flow into a country still included on our list of state sponsors of terrorism. not only does this deal end long-held sanctions, it also lifts arms embargos as we have heard. the embargo ends in five years under this agreement and the ballistic missile ban is lifted in eight years. we should be mindful of our closest ally in the region, israel, whose leaders continue to warn us of the dangers of trusting the iranian regime. the president said our options are accepting this deal or going to war. i think that rhetoric is irresponsible. economic sanctions have served as one of the most effective peaceful methods of suppressing the iranian regime. when our national security is
on the line, reaching no deal is certainly better than advancing a bad deal. congress must stop this bad deal and pursue a stronger agreement which enforces greater measures on iran and ensures the safety of our country and our allies. thank you, mr. speaker, i yield back. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from michigan. mr. levin: how much time is there. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from michigan has 6 1/2 minutes remain, the gentleman from wisconsin has 6 3/4 minutes remaining. mr. levin: i yield three minutes to the gentlelady from michigan, mrs. dingell. the speaker pro tempore: the gentlelady is recognized for three minutes. ms. din fwell: thank you, mr. speaker. thank you, mr. levin, for yielding me the time. first, i rise with so many of my colleagues today in remembrance of one of the worst days in our nation's history. it is a solemn day of remembrance and prayer for those who lost their lives on that fateful day. as americans, we must be united
as a nation in fighting terrorism which we know remains a threat every single day in this country. september 11 is a day burned in the hearts and souls of all americans and we must work hard together, together, to ensure that we never witness such a horrific tragedy in our homeland ever again. we all agree never again. and i say that like my colleagues from new york, mr. crowley, as a woman who lost a cousin and a -- in a terrorist act and watched a woman i love never recover from her son's death. we all care. congress and this country as a whole have a responsibility to work with nations across the world in pursuant -- in pursuit
of peace. my district is home to one of he largest populations of arab americans in the country who, like is many of us -- who, like so many of us, came to the united states as immigrants. they are among the most patriotic americans i know. they are proud to be americans and have made numerous contributions to this great nation. and today, i ask you to also remember this. i rise in support of the joint comprehensive plan of action. like so many, it was not an easy decision and it was made with the most -- utmost respect for my colleagues and friends on both sides of the aisle. this process has shown me that no matter what decision one reaches on this issue, almost everyone shares the same
concern. and they've been named and reviewed many times so i'm not going to go over them. but what i do want to say is, and we've said many times, it's not based on trust. it's based on verification. and that's the last point i want to address today. congressional oversight of the iran deal will not end with this vote. in fact, it will just be the beginning. this effort must be bipartisan and i hope it will be divorced from the acrimonious politic that was dominated too much of this discussion. mr. levin: i yield the gentlelady 30 seconds. the speaker pro tempore: the gentlelady is recognized. mrs. dingell: to my colleagues on both sides of the aisle let's work together for peace in the middle east and across
the aisle. politics and rhetoric only complicate an already difficult decision. september 11 should be a day we used to remind us of what binds us together, the values we share, the love of america that every one of us in this institution has, and let's work together to protect this nation we so dearly love. thank you, mr. speaker. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from wisconsin. mr. ryan: at this time i would like to yield 2 1/2 minutes to the distinguished member from minnesota, mr. paulsen. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman is recognize for 2 1/2 minutes. mr. paulsen: several years ago, 400 members of congress in this body a huge bipartisan majority, voted to increase sanctions on iran because they recognized that smart, targeted sanctions would curtail the iranian economy and help unite the world against the iranian nuclear weapons program.
desperate for sanctions relief, iran came to the negotiation table. i support diplomatic efforts, it was hopeful that the president would be able to bring back a good deal. in fact, 365 representatives, 84% of the house, sent a letter to the president saying we could accept the deal that accomplished four things. this a long-lasting deal that ensured iran had no pathway to a bomb, that it fully disclosed the military aspects of its program, that we had any time, anywhere inspections, and that we addressed iran's ballistic missile capabilities and its destabilizing role in the region. sadly none of these principles were met in this deal. the president claimed thises the strongest nonproliferation deal ever negotiated. that isn't true. in our nonproliferation agreement with libya, we demanded they completely eliminate sentry fuges, halt all advanced centrifuge development, completely
eliminate its uranium stockpile, give unfettered access to the iaea and completely eliminate its long range missile program and would ratify the safest safeguards known as the additional protocol. under this agreement, iran doesn't have to do any of this. will a nuclear iran make the world a safer place? instead of giving the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism hundreds of billions of dollars and more intercontinental ballistic missile tknology and weapons, we should demand a better bay. the president should be working with congress in a bipartisan way because the world deserves a verifiable, enforceable, and accountable agreement that enhances safety, stability, and security. i yield back. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from michigan. mr. levin: i reserve. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman reserves. the gentleman from wisconsin. mr. ryan: at this time i yield two minutes to the gentlelady from arizona, ms. mcsally. the speaker pro tempore: the gentlelady is recognize for two
minutes. ms. mcsally: mr. speaker, i rise today on behalf of those who do not have a voice today in this debate, that's the over 500 service men and women who died in iraq because of the export of vehicle-borne i.e.d. technology by iran. by the brutal terrorist leader suleimani who used money from iran and who will be get manager money to export with the sole purpose to kill american troops and the thousands who are wounded. i deployed to this region six times in my military career. and our military is concerned about this administration turning their back on the men and women who died. and the strength that they need in order to keep that region safe and secure. this is a slap in the face to those who paid that sacrifice. suleimani is a brutal man, we have studied him throughout my military career.
he's exporting terror all over the region, not just in the region, he's responsible for deaths in india and latin america. he's funding money to the assad regime. over 250,000 dead. hezbollah and hamas. i said a few -- i stood a few weeks ago on the oming they have gaza strip where thousands of rockets were lauged last summer, killing innocent civilians in israel. israelis have seven to 30 seconds to run to shelter. they are funded and exported by suleimani in iran. we stood on the northern border near where hezbollah, funded by on -- by iran is stockpiling over 100,000 rockets. this is a dangerous deal. and this is not about a choice between this deal or war. those of us who served in the military, we want war less than anybody else. we know the price. we want diplomacy. those sanctions were working. we just cranked them up in the last 18 months. they are cash-strapped in iran. they are fighting in between
their desires and different factions of how will they use that money to continue to move their nuclear program forward or export terror. we have them exactly where we wanted and then gave up. if we give them -- the speaker pro tempore: the gentlelady is recognized for an additional 15 seconds. ms. mcsally: with the icbm embargo, it is going to be a more dangerous military action and more american lives will be lost. -- it is potentially war. i ask you to please vote against this deal. it is dangerous for the many reasons my colleagues have mention bud do it on bhf of those who dway the ultimate sacrifice. thank you, mr. speaker, i yield back. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman from michigan has three minutes. mr. levin: are you ready to close? i yield myself the balance of our time. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman is recognized. mr. levin: we've had a vigorous debate. this agreement is going into effect.
as we have debated here this morning, that's a fact. and so this is the challenge before this body. and that is whether we will try to recapture some real bipartisanship or if we essentially will forfeit it. there's work to be done implementing this agreement. that's acknowledged by all. and the question is, whether we will join together to try to make it work, an agreement that i support, but i think the same responsibility is incumbent pon those who oppose it. or as the speaker said, he says they've just begun to fight.
that, i think, is the wrong approach in a very important way. both to this agreement but also beyond. because there's work to be done in terms of efforts to reinforce security in the middle east, especially for israel. there's work to be done in the middle east and beyond in terms of fighting terrorism. there's work to be done outside of the middle east, everywhere, so i think it's a deep mistake to leave this moment here with this agreement going into effect saying the fight will continue. no, the fight should be with all of us together to make this work
and to address the continuing challenges that face this country and the middle east and eyond. so i close as someone with everybody else who worked so hard on this, who has come to a conclusion each on our own, but i think the tenor here sometimes is deeply troubling. and i thank the -- think the speaker's statement, the fight has just begun, over what? i hope not over the effort to continue the flames of partisanship that sometimes have captured this debate and before. we all took the pledge. we have a solemn obligation, i
think, to work together. and i think it would be a deep mistake to have it forfeited for reasons of political advantage. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman's time has expired. the gentleman from wisconsin. mr. ryan: mr. speaker, i yield myself the remainder of the time. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman is recognized for 2 1/2 minutes. mr. ryan: mr. speaker, it's no secret that we believe that the president has exceeded his authority in so many ways. that he stretched the separation of powers on lots of issues. and on most of those issues i believe we can fix those problems. on most of those issues, whether it's regulations or domestic laws, i believe we in this body with the next administration will have the power and ability to fix this. this is one where i don't think we can. i think he stretch the constitution because this should be a treaty. this is an executive agreement. when asked why, they said we couldn't pass a treaty.
so much for the constitution that we all swore to uphold. mr. speaker, i don't think the president's going to get the legacy that he thinks he's going to get or that he's hoping he's going to get. i'd like to ask unanimous consent to put in the record a letter from 194 former military officers. it says this agreement is unverifiable. as military officers, we find it unconscionable that such a windfall could be given to a regime that even the obama administration has acknowledged will use a portion of such funds to continue to support terrorism. the speaker pro tempore: without objection. mr. ryan: this is an agreement that waives the sanctions against terrorism. this is a regime that funds terrorism. it said nothing about stopping further terrorism. it lifts the bans on conventional weapons so they could arm back up. it lifts the bans on intercontinental missiles.
the only reason you have an icbm is to put a nuclear weapon on it. it guarantees iran becomes a nuclear power. and it gives them $150 billion up front to finance it. about a decades ago -- about a decade ago i was in debate in a tank graveyard, spent the morning walking through acres of destroyed m-1 abram tanks, humvees, mraps and they had the same kind of signature blast, a whole right through it, killing whoever was inside, our soldiers. then we went up to baghdad and met with one of our senior commanders, and we asked, what is killing all of our service members? hat is doing this? e.f.p.'s, explosively formed penetrators. he got one of them they conif i stated. he showed us what it was. a highly sophisticated machine explosive device with wiring on it that said, made in iran.
brought by a gentleman maimed solely manny -- solely mainy. this is not a person for some person's gacy. this is a vote to put yourself on the right side of >> the house went on to reject he iraq nuclear agreement by 162-269. they also expressed the sense of the house that the obama administration has failed to give lawmakers enough information about side deals. the house is done for the week. members return wednesday after the jewish holiday of ross ha shanna. ollow -- of ros hashana. in the senate, members return tuesday at 6:00 p.m. to try to bring the bill to a vote again.
watch the senate live on c-span2. for more on what happens next, we spoke with a capitol hill eporter. the white ollows house the president a shoutout on the iran deal, i'm gratified by the lawmakers led by democratic leader pelosi who have taken care to judge the deal. tell us how leader pelosi got the votes she got, only 25 went over and voted against the iran deal in the house. guest: well, you know, this is not just a win for president obama and his legacy as he builds this iran deal but really for the democratic leadership here in congress. leader pelosi was able to keep so many of her democratic lawmakers, they are in the
minority, keep them aligned behind president obama. enough members that had the republicans succeeded in sending a resolution of disapproval to the president and if he had sent it back with a veto, she would have had the numbers to uphold it and a -- and that's a real testament to the strength of leader pelosi in keeping folks together on what was for many a very , very difficult issue. you saw people over the last several weeks taking so much care to make their decisions, talking to so many constituents, having so much pressure. they were releasing these pages and pages long statements of their views. it was a very difficult decision but leader pelosi was able to keep her democrats behind the president and that was a real change from what people thought going into this. republicans had the wind at their back and they really came out not with the outcome. -- not with the outcome they
had hoped for. host: the house also passed two measures, one dealing with the contention that the administration hadn't provided enough information on the so-called side deals and the other one preventing the president from lifting the sanctions. republicans see this as a win but what does this mean in terms of any future action in the senate? guest: this is a slow motion end of the debate. i think we will continue to see votes like this. possibly more in the house and certainly senate majority leader mitch mcconnell has set up another vote in the senate for next tuesday evening to try again to break the democratic filibuster on the senate resolution of disapproval of the deal. those efforts at this point appear to be largely symbolic because it does not seem that republicans are going to be able to change any of their democratic colleagues to join them on this.
once these lawmakers have made up their minds again on a very difficult decision, it's difficult for them to switch back. so these measures will sort of be out there and will be continued efforts but i don't know that it will result in any changes to the implementation of the iran deal which as you know by september 17 was the original deadline. congress said will flow past that and take up these issues down the road. host: you talk about symbolic, one of the headlines in your piece says that as well. after failing to block iran deal, g.o.p. conducts symbolic votes against it. take us back to the house and their determination to switch from a resolution of disapproval to this three-prong approach including trying to pass an approval resolution and the other two measures we've talked about.
what's the fallout from that or is there any fallout of that in the terms of the rank and file on the republican side? guest: you have had a last-minute upsurge of revolt in the house. this is familiar territory we've seen before. the republican leaders have a plan, agreed on in the house and senate, and rank and file lawmakers in the house decide not to go along. this shouldn't be surprising because there was a lot of concern among rank and file lawmakers over the plan or the strategy, but it did certainly blind-side house speaker john boehner and majority leader kevin mccarthy and they had to switch gears this week. while the senate was passing this disapproval resolution, or was trying to, they thought, we'll take this opportunity, disapprove of the resolution and set a veto showdown with the white house. we'll force president obama to have to veto the bill and send
it back to congress. even if congress was unable to overturn that veto, republicans thought that would at least be a strong show of their disappointment and their rejection of this deal. f course that didn't happen. it didn't get out of the senate and the house never voted on that because of their own infighting. the problem with the rank and file were practical and political. they didn't think it was strong enough and had concerns about the side deals that the international atomic energy agency has negotiated with iran. and they wanted more meat to it. they also on a practical level -- they were frustrated by what was happening in the senate and the democrats' ability to filibuster and wanted to do something stronger that would put everyone in the house on stronger footing going forward. again that didn't pass either and this issue that had once been sort of in republicans'
favor really sort of collapsed around them. host: viewers can read more about the debate at latimes.com and follow lisa on twitter at lee sassmascaro. >> earlier today they discussed the inspections. this is about an hour and a half. >> thank you for coming to hudson institute. i want to thank our c-span audience, the panel we're conducting today, first of all, i -- representative pompeo, representative mike pompeo, will not be able to make it this afternoon as we had announced yesterday on the spur of the moment. be here but they're going to be voting today, including on iran issues. as many of you know,
representative pompeo, along with senator tom cotton who we had a few weeks ago now, these are lead advocates for congressional review on the secret side deals between iran and the iaea. so even if -- even though representative pompeo can't be here, i hope you'll follow what he's doing, what representative roskam and senator cotton are doing. to this afternoon's panel, we have a fantastic panel led by david albright who has been to hudson before. institute t of the for science and international security. mr. albright has been the analysis that his organization has been providing on the iran deal as well as different things about the iranian nuclear facilities are invaluable and i also recommend that you follow what isis
nuclear is doing. so thank you very much again david for being with us here again. omri saron.is i need to recommend his work, he's been taking up a lot of political and partisan matters on the iran debate unfolding here. it's a privilege to have him here. this is his first time at hudson, i believe. thank you for being here. to his left is a hudson colleague, hudson institute senior fellow michael duran. it's always a pleasure to sit on the same panel as mike. mike will be taking up today, he'll be taking up some of the broader implications of the joint comprehensive plan of action, especially how it relates to, especially how it relates to american strategy in the middle east and what it looks like in the -- with that
deal, what the ramifications and consequences of that deal look like in the broader middle east. it's an exceptional panel. i look forward to learning a lot from it. and i hope you do too. right now, david if you would start that would be terrific. david: thank you very much. this is my first day back in washington officially since the end of may, so i -- >> welcome back. david: i missed much of the personal combat that's been going on with this agreement. my institute and i are neutral on this deal. we were deeply involved in developing provisions in the deal, red teaming provisions, we worked closely with some negotiators in the agreement. we -- some of the negotiators said some of the provisions, we -- our name is on it. we share with other governments and groups. but our name is on several of these provisions.
and so i -- but at the same time, when we accept the deal and also the final deal, we see several weaknesses in the deal. and i think we decided that in order to do objective, nonpartisan analysis, we would not take sides in this debate. so even though i was in europe, i have done nothing else but assess this deal for the last two months and we have put out probably 10 to 15 reports on provisions of the deal which i recommend if you're interested. it is very complicated, it has many strengths, it has many weaknesses. one of the -- the issue today s over the adequacy of the i aea-iran deal to try to solve the problem of access and to contribute to solving the problems associated with determining the verification of the allegations that iran had a nuclear weapons program in the
past. and to do that in the context of the implementation period of the agreement that's going to happen over the fall and winter. and is that verification effort by the iaea going to go well? is it going to strengthen the verification of the final deal? or is it going to create precedents and weaken the verification? what i'd like to do is just quickly, actually, summarize a report we'll either issue today r on monday on this agreement. also some general issues around parchin and satellite analysis of the site. it's clear the iaea has reported regularly that the modifications at the parchin site have undermined their ability to do effective verification. that's the starting point. large amounts of modifications. the iaea doesn't know what's taking place but their analysis from satellite imagery is that
it's problematic for verification. now, i would argue rks and i will, that this iran iaea parchin deal has further complicated verification of that site. it's not a public agreement. i worked on -- worked intensively on iran since 2002 and i've worked on many countries, iraq, south africa, worked with the iaea inspectors in iraq in the 1990's. we've also published extensively about other countries, and used that day tafment the iaea is a secretive organization. its mandate requires secrecy. but in the iran case it's not been secret, it's been pretty transparent. iran complained about that bitterly for years. it's saying the iaea is leaking confidential information. i think the iaea could make this iran deal public,
particularly could release it to the member states, and it would actually, that would be consistent with what they've been doing on iran. i think the secrecy of it raises questions that do need to be addressed and also, in my experience with the iaea, they do excessively classify, if i can use a u.s. term, that they -- they'll do it for all the same reasons. it may have nothing to do with legitimate ones, proprietary information, security information. it can hide embarrassing information. i would argue in this this case, it's embarrassing what this parchin deal has. and i think you've all probably had a chance to see the details of it. the associated press went to great lengths to try to get a draft of it. they confirmed that was a draft. they then confirmed, at least they told me, i think they reported it, the final deal wasn't that different from the
draft. what you have is a situation where they'll be -- there'll be videotaping of the potential locations where sampling would take place. then the iaea would direct the iranians to take the samples. and that's not the normal way to do things. if i could give the example in iran of kawai; electric a secret centrifuge and electric facility that iran denied was such a thing. the iaea got access and brought in a top centrifuge expert with that access who looked around. when they did the sampling finally, they didn't find any trace of enriched uranium in the areas that had been heavily modified but in a secondary build they found in a ventilation duct, which had not been modified, they found trace of enriched uranium. you need the eyes and brain to look where to sample. i brought an example of sampling in north korea. i can't show it, it's -- this
is actually a document where they sampled in the processing plant in the early 1990's in north korea. and north korea didn't expect environmental sampling. it was a highly classified method that was unclassified as a result of the iraq war in 1991 and the idea to strengthen the iaea. so they deployed it. you can see the sampling, they're looking behind this box. what's -- in this case, north korea didn't expect this. look for where it's dusty. the idea, it's not been disturbed. in the case of parchin it would be look for where the paint doesn't look solid. and so that's very hard to do with a video camera. i think the video camera opens up additional methods of deceiving the iaea and it's not the normal way they've been doing it. i think that's a problem. the other is really precedent. where the iaea isn't getting
access to the physical locations where samples are being taken. and the deal as reported by a.p. says that the director general and his direct deputy -- his deputy director general on safeguards do this. now we, in my own work with the a.p. and i talked to the journalists involved in this, he believes that the deal he was shown and he was able to transcribe, it has some errors n it, but he has reported that that is an accurate rendition. in congressional testimony, i know that u.s. officials have testified, i've heard from, i won't say who, sometimes it's congressmen who have said that the sampling would be done and then the iaea access would follow. so the access is coming at a point where it's not as useful. politically, access is
important. but again, you want it to drive the inspection effort and the environmental sampling effort, not be done at the end of the process. so again, what happens with other sites? what happens if there's another question in parchin? there's other sites the iaea asked to visit associated with this verification of possible military dimensions of iran's program. and are they going to be, in a sense, subject to these kind of rules when they go there? another reason you want access is to talk to the scientists and engineers involved. now, whether that's going to happen, i don't know. there's a second secret deal, and we call it confidential arrangements. some people object to the word secrecy but to me it's all the same. but technically it's a confidential agreement. will the iaea be able to do its job which is to come to closure
on verification of iran's past military activities by december 15? and i think this agreement on parchin is weakening that effort. with the broader scheme, the long-term agreement, you have to ask whether this is setting precedent for that. i think legally with the additional protocol you could argue that it's not but iran has violated safeguards agreements many times. it's pushed the envelope and so let's say you go out and there's a suspect site, the iaea has to go there, the clock starts ticking on this access provision of 24 days. iran says you can't have access but we can do video monitoring and we'll take samples. and what's going to happen? i would argue and worry actually that there's some countries in europe who are going to be having heavy
investments in iran and iran is going to be appealing to them to say, look, this worked in the parchin case, you accepted it, you supported it publicly. why can't it work here? do you really want to snapback sanctions -- snap back sanctions over something that's proven or was acceptable in a highly controversial case like paveragen? i would worry that -- parchin. i would worry that the europeans may not stick with the united states. i think the u.s. will vote to snap back. but i think there's worry the united states -- the others may not. certainly you can't count on russia and china. you just need one of the three to say, maybe we're not going to go with this. so i think it's also in the long-term, it's a problem -- the long term, it's a problem. finally, we want the iaea to be as strong as it can be. it can be incredibly strong. in north korea they nailed the north koreans to the wall with environmental sampling and other evidence to say they had
an undeclared production of plutonium and separation of plutonium. they didn't know how much, but they had them cold. there have been other cases where they've done. that they caught them despite modification. but, iran's gotten better at modification. it's certainly learned. and i think we can't -- i think the electric example actually proves the case that you have to worry more about parchin. it doesn't prove the case that the iowa will find it no matter what -- iaea will find it no matter what. the iranians have learned and they are probably much better at modification and undermining the iaea than before and so you want to make sure that the iaea goes into this long term agreement as strong as possible, it does address or satisfy the concerns over the possible military dimensions of iran's program and we get closure on that and we in a sense march into this agreement where the iaea has as much
credibility as possible. i worry that the way it's going is they're going to have reduced credibility and that's going to give an advantage to iran, it's going to come back to haunt us. lee: thank you very much. that was a terrific introduction. one of the topics i want to come back, regarding the iaea's credibility and how this might be affected by that, but one thing i wanted to check before we went on to omry, when you were saying that the draft that the a.p. published, they checked that with, you were saying, the iaea verifying that that was close to that, or -- david: no. they went to member states. this is how this works. the iaea people -- let me not put words in a.p. they have sources, they're based in vienna. and they went to sources to verify. one can imagine, too, that -- well, let me end it there. i don't want to take any more
time. lee: that story was sourced to officials from member states. pecifically. omry, if would you like to pick up. fill out some of the -- omri: sure. i think in addition to the geopolitical environment and the verification regime, it's important to understand the dynamics that have emerged here in town over the last month, , certainly before that, this debate has been shaping up for several years. but really after the announcement of the jcpoa in the middle of july you saw a particular kind of debate shape up here in town. and it has a range of dimensions that have to do with intersections between policy and politics, frustration on he hill. the administration is operating
in an environment in which they've lost the benefit of the doubt with many lawmakers. both republican lawmakers and democratic lawmakers. and that comes from a number of places. it comes from frustration by lawmakers who believe that they were led, that they were essentially had their chains pulled for several years, for several years, of course, administration officials would go to the hill and they would testify that if only were they to be given breathing room for negotiations they would bring home a deal that robustly resolved the possible military dimensions of iran's program, that would lead to the shuttering of fordo, that would lead very, very pointedly to any time, anywhere inspections. and members feel betrayed. they're saying openly that had they known back then that this would be the deal now, they would have pursued alternative legislative paths, including most prominently sanctions legislation. that's one place in which -- one reason that the administration has lost the
benefit of the doubt. another reason is what members perceive to be simple dishonesty. they believe that the administration has repeatedly politicized intelligence as far as iranian cheating over the course of the jpoa, the interim joint plan of action. they believe that the administration is looking the other way on iranian sanctions busting of u.n. sanctions. they believe that they're not getting the information -- the united nations panel, which was supposed to monitor compliance, and various members of congress are not getting the information that they deserve. of course this has recently come to a head in the last couple of days in the policy conversation when it comes to the politicalization of intelligence that has to do with isis. but that's also another thing that's in the air. which is to say they just don't trust the administration to give them accurate information. and then of course the third reason why they're operating in an environment of distrust is this specific debate over
failing to transmit to lawmakers the side deals, the secret side deals, between the iaea and iran and, again, secret side deals is a loaded term. it's a term that's used by detractors and opponents of the deal but there was a moment, would have been two weeks ago, three weeks ago, there was a state department briefing at which an a.p. reporter finally got frustrated with the administration and said, can we stipulate that a deal that's classified we can call secret and a deal that's parallel we can call side? that kind of ended the debate about whether there are secret side deals but the other side prefers to not call them secret side deals and uses lines like, this is not just secret, this is just the way adults do business. saying that to a lawmaker when they say there's a secret side deal is not a productive way to rebuild trust. that has occurred on a number of occasions. this specific issue, it takes place in a much broader environment and i don't choose your metaphor, underlines,
highlight, puts an exclamation point at the end of, deep, deep, deep distrust on the hill toward the administration. which is one of the reasons why it has legs. why this idea of the secret side deals has legs. that's the political reason. the kind of public affairs reason, we'd call the communications reason, you know, if you quickly divide the town politics, policy, public affairs, politics is distrust on the hill. the public affairs reason has to do with how the administration approached messaging on this issue. so the administration does polling, both sides on this debate do a ton of polling. both sides very, very early saw the same three things popping up. one was the importance of science and expertise, which is why the administration never missed an opportunity, especially during the last few months of the negotiation, to emphasize that scientists agree with them.
this kind of reached a point that caused a lot of people to smirk. secretary of energy moniz during the vienna talks went to -- i want portugal or spain, swbswr in iberia, for an award. he came back and then he tweet ed a picture. it's now back to work to lock in an agreement based on hard science. anywhere that they could insert the term they inserted it because they saw that it boosted public popular tifment the second thing that -- popularity. the second thing that both sides saw, how you described the agreement really mattered. if you described it as iran grease to never construct a nuclear weapon, they saw an eight to 10-point bump in approval. they then by the way took that wording and started inserting it into their own polls or into the polls of validaters in order to boost the numbers. that was the second thing. but the third thing that both sides saw was that voters overwhelmingly dislike iran, iran has the lowest favorability of most middle east actors, highest
unfavorability. but the reason they do it, the reason that -- what causes that dislike is distrust. so you ask people, why should the u.s. stand in opposition to iran? it's a standard kind of wording that we use. they cite all sorts of things. iran is dedicated to the destruction of the u.s., destruction of our allies, iran stones rape victims for adultery, iran hangs gays from cranes. but what's underneath that is distrust. they don't trust iran not to do those things. which is why you saw the administration develop the talking point that this deal was not built on trust. if you go back to their materials, that develops very, very, very early because they were saying the same -- seeing the same things we were seeing, which is distrust is potentially toxic to support of negotiations with iran. the side deals agreement in the same way that in a political dimension reinforces
pre-existing distrust among lawmakers, in a public affairs dimension reinforces public distrust. the reason that this is so toxic in terms of the white house's public affairs campaign is because it very, very, very precisely casts a spotlight on something that they very much do not want to play with, which is distrust of iran. and now there's the policy implications. david talked a lot about this in greater depth. one thing that i think it's important to note is that it's not just the policy community that's concerned about the parchin arrangement becoming a precedent, the arrangement of course is videotaping, allowing the iranians to take their own samples and hand them over to the agency, and negotiating with the iranians on a limited number of samples that will be taken from a limited number of places. congressman royce sent a letter to secretary kerry in which he
also discussed his worry that this would become a precedent. he cited specifically one of the paragraphs in annex one of the jcpoa. somewhere in the 70's, for give me, i should know this. 71 or 77. that talks about alternative arrangements that the iranians are allowed to offer when the agency requests access. representative royce asked -- told secretary kerry, i worry that this will become a precedent. so you have this side deals issue playing out really across everything that counts in town here. politics, policy and public affairs. and in the last 48 hours, that has now become a legislative issue or at least an issue in the battle between congress and the president over the arrangement. so there's been a lot of talk on the hill, both among democrats and republicans, but in the context of this
strategy, it's largely republican strategy, that the so-called corker clock, the 60-day clock during which congress has the right to review the jcpoa and if they feel so moved, to pass a resolution of disapproval, that that clock hasn't started. the administration and frankly leadership in the senate believe -- have stated that it started when the administration transmitted a number of documents relevant to their disclosure obligations. some of those have been leaked, some of those haven't. those involve things like the u.s.'s collapse on p.m.d.'s, it involves arrangements, involves why the intelligence community believes that that collapse is justified. so we know the content of a number of these documents. they were transmitted -- they were transmitted within a couple of days of getting back from vienna. the clock, according to this reading, ends on september 17, which is the last day congress would have to pass a resolution of disapproval. there are many people who are
now claiming that because of the nontransmission of the iaea side deals, that clock hasn't started. there was, until the last 48 hours, no real recourse for those people. they could complain they could say it was illegal. there wasn't much they could do. on tuesday, d.c. district court ruled for the first time ever, this was in the context of an obamacare case, that injury that's done to congress' article one prerogatives is in fact something that can be litigated. in more technical terms, they granted standing to the house to pursue claims of jergens the president. that created the possibility, this has now been discussed by several legal scholars, but it's being written about broadly, the main one is a "the washington post" legal blogger, and he has taken this, he's now writ twon articles that says that in fact the injury done to congress' article one prerogatives does constitute something that can be litigated. he published his first analysis
of this yesterday, just afternoon, at roughly the same time, and i mean within 15 minutes, political -- politico posted an article with a statement from speaker boehner saying that based on the new ruling, i.e., the finding that congress has standings to pursue litigation, he may well sue president obama or the house may well sue president obama over the nontransmission of documents. now, the reasoning is actually a little bit settled. the reason something that the corker clock never started which means congress never had the ability to weigh in at all. so it's not your usual claim that it's illegal to waive sanctions. if that occurs then it would obviously change the policy -- it would radically change the policy environment. for instance, one of the things that the iranians are counting on is a stable regulatory environment that would encourage companies to enter. it's difficult to see how companies could enter in a political environment in which there's bipartisan opposition in both chambers of congress to the deal and a legal
environment that is uncertain. i think on that point -- lee: thanks. that's fantastic. do you know, i mean, if speaker of the house boehner, if he'd been moving on that before the "post" piece? ? something they were talking about before? omri: there were definitely discussions at the beginning of the week and beforehand about a possible litigation strategy but they usually ended with the idea that congress would not be able to find a way to have standing and it would just get bounced out of court. now, if you read the "politico" article it specifically cites the reasoning behind this new district court finding. but -- lee: were they all wait norg decision to come down? -- waiting for this decision to come down? omri: i think they'd been looking for ways to enforce what they consider to be their prerogatives. one of the weird things about this -- about the kind of politics around the corker-cardin debate, and the side deals specifically that we're discussing today, is not needing the corker-cardin
requirements, which is to say, not turning over all of the documents that are relevant to the deal. is disobeying congress' prerogatives on a piece of legislation about congress' prerogatives. right, it's not just not enforcing legislation. it's not enforcing legislation that's specifically about enforcing legislation. and that was passed by enormous in a jorts, -- enormous majorities. and so i think that there were discussions about how to enforce congress' prerogatives that were ongoing, certainly there were discussions on wednesday before "the washington post" piece came out. but "the washington post" piece provided a rationale or at least outlined a rationale that had not existed. without being grandiose about this, in the history of the public. this is a new thing. lee: very interesting. thanks, that was terrific. mike, if you can round us off. and give us an even larger picture that we already have here. mike: sure. only just -- omri just said that it's the first time in the
history of the republic, but it reminds me that any issue of significance in american politics eventually finds its way into the courts. that's the kind of prediction that political analysis that i would like to produce. something that remains true for ever -- forever. lee: i love someone tweeted that. michael: i love davidal bright's announce. conscious davidal bright's announce. there's two personalities in the world. hedge hogs and foxes, i think. he's a fox. he sees complexity, he likes to talk about complexity. i like to lump things together and make them very simple. so i'm going to simplify what he said and turn it into a crudely political statement and say that the administration caved on -- in serious
inspections with regard to the possible military dimensions of the iranian program. the question is, why did they cave and what does it mean? what do these secret side deals mean? how come adults are doing business in this manner? for me, this whole question of the secret side deals epitomizes the entire approach to the nuclear question. or you can see, you can see imbedded in this or reflected in this the motives and the approach of the administration to the whole thing. let me -- that's a general statement. let me give you the specifics. one of the fascinating -- a lot of people are saying about the administration, when they see things like this, when they've caved on what we might call the more coercive measures of the agreement, so the inspections
and verification and snapback and so on, when you look closely at these mechanisms, they evaporate -- -- they evaporate. our colleagues here at hudson did a very good aa nal sis of the so-called -- analysis of e so-called 23 days that the ranians have in order to oppose any effort to inspectacular a suspect site. and under their analysis, which i think is very convincing, the 23 days quickly becomes many, many, many months. possibly even longer. because of the inability to bring this process to an end at any point and to actually coerce the iranians into getting what you want. as david sort of suggested, at a certain point, you find yourself, when you're pushing up against the iranians, the only option you have is, for lack of a better word, the nuclear option of blowing up the whole deal in order to get
what you want from them. so it isn't a very effective mechanism. when people look at this, at the way that the administration has caved on these coercive measures, there's a tendency to say that we were bamboozled, that the iranians are master negotiators, they play chess, we play checkers. we're just smalltown american simpletons and they live in this complex middle eastern environment and so on. but actually the people running our government are more clever than that. they're not smalltown simpletons and they know what they're doing. they are presenting what is actually one kind of agreement as another kind of agreement. because as omri has told us, they've done -- and as i'm sure he's correct -- they've done extensive polling of the american people and they found out that the american people don't trust the iranians. and they don't want a u.s. strategy that is based on
trusting the iranians. but the fact of the matter is the president decided almost from the moment he got into office, possibly even before he got into office, that we need the iranians as a partner in the middle east. and the logic is absolutely simple. the president, the most important decision that the president made about the middle east, about iran, was one he made when he was campaigning and that is that he was going to pull the united states back from the region. the minute you say you want to pull the united states back rom the region, you are done as the leader of a serious policy designed to contain iran in the region. the only way then to affect that pullback is to come to some kind of accommodation with the iranians. the biggest problem you have is their nuclear program. so they needed a way to put the nuclear question off to one side. well, they got down to the serious business of aligning
with the iranians against isis and other -- that's the bad isis, not the good isis that david runs. against isis and other actors. so, that's what this agreement n my view is really all about. yes, they do want to stop the nuclear program. that is a goal of the obama administration. but it is not the only goal they have and it's not the primary goal. the primary goal is to pull the united states back from the middle east and to come up with a regional security architecture that will allow the united states to stay out. these two goals have been working simultaneously all along and at a certain point they run counter to each other. because in order to pull the u.s. back they've got to reach an agreement on the nuclear
program. and the iranians picked up on that and they recognize that getting the agreement was more important for the administration than anything else. and they realize that they could use it to their advantage d they can come up with -- the iranians could offer solutions that were not really solutions, that the administration would accept in the end. so you get this -- to see the amount of creative intelligence that has gone into this on the part of the administration in order to present to us something that is really something else is startling. the side deals is a great example. first of all, you subcontract out some of the work to the iaea so you can say, well, nothing to do with me. i haven't seen those agreement, don't even know what's in them. it isn't part of some kind of secret arrangement that i have with the iranians. the other thing that they've done, which you can see if you read closely in the text of the agreement, is they have sequinsed the issues so it looks like we're getting something that we're not
actually getting. the sequencing in time is that the iranians have to answer the iaea's questions about the possible military dimensions of their program and the iaea will submit a report by december 15 and it's only after that, the submitting of that report, that the -- we get implementation day for the agreement. that's the point at which the removed from the iranians. that sequencing allows the administration to stand and say with a completely -- complete sincerity, complete straight face and total honesty that the lifting of the sanctions will not take place until after the -- until after the iranians submit their answers to the iaea. totally true. what it doesn't tell you, though, is that it makes it sound like there's a conditionality applied here. that the iranians have to answer questions that actually satisfy us about -- and
actually satisfy the iaea in some significant way, that we now know about the possible military dimensions of their program. but that's not what's going to happen. the iranians are going to submit answers. the iaea is going to submit a report and then the sanctions are going to be removed. regardless of what the iranians say and regardless of what the iaea puts in its report. now, both actors, the iranians and the iaea, recognize that they will be putting the united states and the entire p5+1, all of those european foreign ministers who have already been to tehran with trade delegations and so on, will be completely discomfitted if the iaea says, you know what, the iranians stiffed us again. so the iranians are do their best to come as far toward the iaea as they can without actually delivering anything that the iaea really wants and they'll be under enormous
pressure to produce a report that will not embarrass the americans and the other p5+1 partners. but even if he does implementation day still goes forward. because as the agreement is written, there is absolutely no conditionality. and that to me, that is what i say when i see it's reflective of the whole agreement. the president of the united states wants an agreement with iran and he wants an agreement with iran for reasons that have to do with nuclear questions, but even more so for reasons that have to do with the whole position of the united states in the middle east. and you can see this falling, you can see this unfolding before your eyes right now with he russians and the iranians coordinating in an increase in their support for the assad -- their direct military support for the assad regime. this is the direct outcome of the strategic concept of the americans, of working together with the russians and the
iranians to try to tamp down the worst pathologies of the middle east. at some point we should start debating that concept. the administration has not come clean that that is the strategic concept that it's working. the president has not come clean. when asked if he thinks this lead to a s going to greater flexibility of the iranians in the region, he says , the administration talks about both sides -- talkses out of both sides of their mouth. they're saying, we hope that happens but that's not why. we don't trust them. we think the agreement stands alone by it he was. is it is why they're doing it. they are doing it because of this larger concept and the larger concept is flawed. i'd love, lee, if later on we could talk about why it's flawed. but it's flawed and in the end it won't work. lee: this is what i do want to come back. to but david had -- i was going to ask him to comment even if he didn't volunteer to comment, on what you were saying about the iaea. david: i think my organization
were split. i think what michael is saying is this is all cynical exercise . and the argument is, look, iran is modified -- has mottified par children -- has modified parchin. the iaea is very unlikely to find anything. i don't want to get too technical but it's a testament of a initiater made out of uranium. it may have three grams, four grams of uranium in it. that was then blown up 13 years ago or more. and iran's had three years to eliminate any traces of that. and you see it all over the area, that they've done cleanup, they know where it went, they know the weather patterns that day, they know what they need to do. and they've experience at cleanup. in other sites. so they can -- so the cynical version is, they're not going to find anything so who cares if this is a weak deal? just get through this. place the dow to
iaea flag at parchin and say, we have access. another side of my group wants that, look, every step of this process we want the iaea to be doing the most rigorous verification possible. we want to make sure their credibility is strong, we want to make sure that if they go to parchin and they say we didn't find any uranium, that they can say it's because of, you know, modification and we believe that's true. or maybe they'll find uranium. maybe they'll get lucky. and they'll find uranium. but then you've got to show that that uranium was related to an experiment related to nuclear weapons. that's another problem i didn't get into. but that attribution is nontrivial. a lot of uranium in the world. you've got to detect it and attribute it properly. you want them to be doing the most rigorous methods possible
in order to grain credibility in their findings. the other -- and then what michael ace's saying is, -- michael's saying is, this is a box-checking exersiles. the administration said you're not going to find -- we know they had a nuclear weapons program. we don't really care about the past. we care about the future. and let's just get through this. and get the sanctions off. i know i've been breeched by white house officials -- briefed by white house whofingses who say they do care -- officials who say they do care. we're a very technical organization and we've dealt with technical people in various countries on this. we don't deal with the policy and the p.r. parts. and i know that by march, february -- no, march -- february, march, april of this year, that what i was being told in briefings by white house officials or -- was different than what n.g.o.'s were being told by more senior white house officials. and i even complained about it and the answer i got, well, you
just have to understand it's different. lee: can you say how it was different? david: i don't want to go into any samples per se but it's over -- this would be -- let me use this. this would be an example where i'm told it does matter. if the iaea's concerns are not addressed and we can talk about what that means, it may not mean what you're thinking, that sanctions would not come off. but listen to secretary of state kerry. others are told, and you hear him say, what happened in the past doesn't matter. is that my phone? oh, i'm sorry. i thought i turned it off. so i think -- lee: it's not secretary kerry. david: yeah. the bottom line is that we don't know. in fact, when i commented on this difference in the
briefings, my reaction was, look, the people who are briefing these n.g.o.'s, i think they're really spinning them. i mean, i'm kind of disturbed by how the arms control community has bought into a lot of stuff to win this fight. that is compromising their, i believe, their integrity. but the bottom line is that the people who are higher are spinning, where the technical, scientific people are lower. and i believe they're not. but who's going to control the decision on implementation day? that's really the issue. there's no meeting scheduled among the p5+1 to sit down and say, you know, they've addressed the iaea concerns. it will be up to what happens in the u.s. government mind on implementation day to make a decision on whether this condition would stop the lifting of sanctions. i'm not ready to predict what
happens. we've approached this very differently. he used an example of fox or whatever. michael: hedge haj and a fox. david: we see it very differently. scientists in washington are constantly confronted with the reality of, if you're going to make a mistake, do it right. and what happens is that we see our role as we see problems and that we also want an integrity to the process. we do want it more transparent, of course. but we want an integrity to the process that the work is done rigorously and that it can with stand review. i think that motivates our work to a great extent. and that's also why we're neutral. we want to be able to look at the strengths and value those. we want to look at the weaknesses. and just.net into it without thinking or hearing a voice in our ear, oh, my god, you support the deal, you better not say that. i can tell you, we get beat up all the time because left wing
groups use our work or i guess right now the, in this debate, we've had these fights before on the aluminum tubes in iraq. august, september, 2000, our work, say questioning the aluminum tubes used in centrifuges was certainly not appreciated by the right wing. and we took a lot of abuse for those positions. on the syrian reactor, we thought the site bomb by israel was a reactor and many in the left attacked us. and went after us. for that. and we see this case today on the iran deal, particularly this summer, where the left i think is attacking us and it's in the similar vein. they're defending things that really shouldn't be defended. this deal has problems that have to be faced. and i think the iaea is one of them that you need to find a way, and this is where maybe i'm not as pessimistic as you, maybe it's just optimistic, the
iaea has to find a way to strengthen what it's doing over the next several months. you're not going to change this iaea parchin deal or iaea-iran parchin deal. it's in place. they can try to make the best of it. they can then try to get access to other sites. they can do a rigorous job on the verification of the possible military dimensions issue. and try to come out of this with the strongest report possible in december and that can withstand criticism. lee: omri, i think you wanted to follow up. omri: this issue of what the white house was telling -- you know, most of the think tanks in this city have attempted to work with the administration in order to point out flaws over the previous two years and so on. that's happened both on the nuclear side, the stuff that david works on, but also in the context of the sanctions regime and so on. and there really was, the dynamic really did develop
where the white house would be telling its validaters, these n.g.o.'s, one thing, and would be telling these experts that were trying to contribute a different thing. experts would show up with concerns like p.m.d.'s, with concerns like, you know, the iranians will push back against inspections, with concerns like what are you doing allowing the iranians to produce heavy water reactors after 15 years out of the agreement? and the experts would be told one thing and then the n.g.o.'s would be spun up and told something different. lee: i want to check. just make sure what david was saying, the experts were being told something by lower level officials who were themselves scientific or technical experts. alan: largely but not always. lee: -- omri: largely but not lways. perhaps one of the gentlingist things he could say was being spun up.
then toward the end, especially the final days of vienna and after vienna, something very distressing began to happen which is that all of the excuses that were being provided to the white house validaters, to these n.g.o.'s, to go out and validate were actual concessions that got built into the agreement. e the do know on which sid actual text falls. on one side -- when it comes to things like p.m.d.'s, the possible military dimension of iran's past nuclear work, you know, experts were being told, of course these matter, we need them to baseline the program, we don't know how far the iranian as got, there are all kinds of technical details like it's important to know what kind of bomb design they were working on because that goes into calculations of how much uranium they need in order to produce that bomb which is the breakout calculation. so there are all kinds of experts saying, of course we need to resolve these p.m.d.'s. and then there was the spin that was, it crystalized in secretary kerry's statement to
a teleconference which is, we have absolute knowledge of iran's past nuclear work and we don't need the iranians to tell us what they did. one was spin and by the way he was roundly, roundly criticized for that and the state department spent the next week walking back that statement. and yet that is the reading that was transmitted to congress. we know that among the documents that were submitted to congress, pursuant to its corker-cardin obligations, there were two documents that dealt with the p.m.d.'s issue at least two. one of those documents said, we've come to the conclusion that -- it's unrealistic and unnecessary to force iran to come clean on its past nuclear work because the u.s. intelligence community has judged that it has sufficient knowledge to detect an iranian breakout and to enforce the deal without having the iranians come clean. and then it said, for an explanation why, please see subsequent classified annex. so that's the first thing that,
i believe it was the "wall street journal," that reported the existence of those documents. bloomberg view subsequently reported on the contents of that other document, the one that purports to explain why it is that the i.c. judges that it doesn't need iran to come clean on its past nuclear work and it turns out that that assessment is premised, without xaggeration, without hyperbole, it's premised on near total iranian cooperation with inspectors over the lifetime of the deal. right? in a very precise way, trust the iranians. so, when we talk about this very, very frustrating process that occurred as the jcpoa was coming together, where experts were being told one thing and white house validaters were being told another, one of the distressing things is that by the end, the spin had become the u.s.'s position. the pecks earth -- the experts' view that we need iran to come clean on its past military -- on the past military nature of its nuclear work was abandoned
in favor of this spin that we know enough about what happened in the past and all that matters are the future. lee: thanks. mike, i think you wanted to respond. michael: i just wanted to say that the picture that david presented of lower level technical experts being committed to their job and inking the best of all this, in contrast to -- and not being influenced by political considerations, and higher level officials having a different view, is built into the d.n.a. of the obama administration. of course it exists in any administration, to a certain extent. but it's really heightened in the case of the obama administration. i think everybody now recognizes this. for a while it was only i think critics of the administration who said this. now i think everyone can see it. there is the president and
four, five close people around him, and then there is everybody else. and the president and his closest advisors are often not sharing with the everybody else , some of their greatest concerns and calculations. we saw just in the last couple of days, there's a fascinating article in "bloomberg" about the russian move, the russian military move in syria. and first reaction of the state department, when this happened, was to go to the russians and the bulgarians and to protest them giving the russians overflight and staging rights for the russians to supply their forces in syria. but according to rogan, the president was very unhappy with this because the state department had run out and done this without consulting him. so my takeaway from that is that the president has one view about the relative advantages
and disadvantages of what the russians are doing and the state department has another. and the president hasn't shared his thinking about the value of the russian and iranian actions in syria with the state department. and he's not going to do it. he's not going to do it because , precisely what omri explained to us, is that the american public does not trust the iranians and the u.s. strategy that is based on coordinating with the iranians is going to be politically illegitimate. lee: let me ask you, mike, you worked in the bush white house and we understand that this is a fairly -- it's not an unusual phenomenon, the idea that a white house and state department don't necessarily see eye-to-eye. these are different bureaucracies. with different ideas. white house is political appointees and state department is a permanent bureaucracy. how is this different? ichael: it's different in that
-- sorry, just to connect the dots. that's how you get to what david was saying before. you get actual technical experts who are presenting what the administration is doing with respect to -- on the basis of technical considerations and the traditional nonproliferation concerns that the u.s. government has, when those nonproliferation concerns are not what's actually motivating the government at the time. the difference is this. i talk to a high level obama official, and this is about a ear ago, and i put to him my thesis that the united states is aligning with iran. and i pointed to a number of different examples where i saw that happening on the ground, in iraq, in syria, in lebanon and so on. he said, you've www.it totally wrong -- you've got it totally wrong, mike. the thing about barack obama is that he approaches the region
like a lawyer. each problem in the region is a separate file, so there's an iranian nuclear file, there's an iraq file, there's a syria file, there's the palestinian file and so on and so forth. and he adamantly refuses, he treats each case on a case by case basis and refuses to make a connection between the different cases. and i look at that, that's what it looks like if you're a high level official in the obama administration dealing with the president. "new york times" famously described the president in a meeting about syria where he was thumbing through his blackberry reading, distracted while this discussion about whether the united states should arm the opposition was going on or not. my view on that is that the president had in fact connected up all of the dots. he just wasn't sharing the connections that he had made with his officials.
he was allowing meetings like this one about syria to go on, allowing the bureaucracy to do its thing,, to keep everybody busy. because he knew, the sing the most important thing -- single most important thing is what he sent to a letter -- in a letter. don't worry, mr. supreme leader. the united states will not do anything on the ground in syria to harm assad. this is the guarantee he gave to khamenei. if you look now for a couple of years, we have been arm aing and training the syrian opposition. in the last year we spent $500 million on arming and training the syrian opposition. and we produced, what, 54 soldiers, 54 soldiers who have signed -- actually signed a declaration saying that they won't do anything to harm assad. nowhere has president obama gone out in public and said, i'm not going to do anything to harm assad because i made this promise to khamenei, because i
don't want to do anything to throw a wrench in the works of the iran deal or because i want to coordinate with iran in the region. he hasn't said that publicly and he hasn't told that to his officials in the syria meeting where everything is going around. he let that meeting go around and around and around and finally when the national security -- the major members of the national security council said, we should arm the opposition, he said, no, i don't want to do it. he ate up months and months of government time debating this issue and then nixed it and that's what's happened time and time again. all what that matters in the end is what we do or don't do to stop iran on the ground in these areas. and as long as he is comfortable knowing that we can make sure that we don't do anything to stop them, he get what's wants without ever declaring what it is. lee: david, i was going to ask you a question unless you wanted to say something, just wanted to change, just wanted
to change tacts a little bit. doesed parchin deal -- does the parchin deal, does the parchin side deal, secret side deal, does this hurt the iaea? i don't think the administration necessarily is looking to hurt the organization. but do you think it does? david: the short answer is i'm worried it does. but i think there needs to be some background. the united states has tremendous influence with the iaea. but it doesn't pull its strength. and kind of as a background, i don't know if you remember in the press there was discussion that the negotiators were going to put in -- create a list of sites and people that the iaea would get access to. and that that was going to be kind of -- the reporting was it was going to be hard-wired into the deal. they went to the iaea and they said, look, we have our own list. in essence, kind of pushing
back. i don't think the negotiators really knew what to do. so, i would think that this iran-iaea deal was not done with the approval of the united states. again, this is just my own experience. i don't think they would have said, go do this. they have been pretty clear in meetings i've had, they want access to parchin. they don't -- some of them don't think anything will be found. lee: i want to be clear, the u.s. does or the iaea does? david: the u.s. wants ac a sess the iaea to have access to parchin. they want the iaea to have ac a sess to other sites. -- ac a sess to other sites -- access to other sites that are associated with p.m.d. and the reason is simple. iran can't create precedence that sites in iran are off limits. the safeguards agreements do not distinguish between military and civilian sites. under the traditional safeguards agreement, the iowa can go -- iaea can go where it needs to go and there's no such
distinction it. can ask to go to a military site -- distinction. it can ask to be -- ask to go to a military site. the board wouldn't have said, you can't do that because it's a military site. it never would have done that. so the united states has strongly wanted to have the precedent set that iran can't deny access. but they want a deal. and so this gets into a very complicated debate. how's the u.s. going to react? i think part of the problem i've seen from, again from europe is that i think both sides are so distorting the facts, i mean, let me be honest, that it's hard to have an honest debate and an objective debate about this. we live on the left. that's where we are. i'll admit it. my group wants nuclear disarmament. and we see iran and north korea as the front line of efforts to get nuclear disarmament. not wrestling with u.s. nuclear
weapons stock pile sides, so we're deeply complitted to these causes traditionally associated with the left. and we're deeply disturbed by how the left has bought into positions and says things that don't even -- aren't even consist went their own views. secrecy at the iaea, that's traditionally a left view, iaea needs to be more open. large centrifuge programs, hundreds of thousands of centrifuges in iran in 15 to 20 years. i mean, most of them are anti-nuclear power or at least don't buy into large sensitive enrichment programs in dangerous regions of the world. and yet they did. and have. so i think there is a need to pull back from this kind of polarization, to have a more honest discussion. and in that i would say that the implementation of this deal does matter and that the united states and others, the public, should be pushing that the iaea do a rigorous job, they recover
from this iran-iaea or this parchin deal and that they push hard to get access to bolster their credibility. and make sure, with the support of the member states, that they march into this, you know, postimplementation day agreement as strong as possible. and then i would say, what do we do? this is a town that works with congress. i would hope that congress does create legislation that puts in conditions to make sure that the deal is implemented better. i mean, we've proposed one, again, i don't know, we don't lobby and follow all the politics of it, and it seems very chaosic right now -- chaotic right now, that congress would pass a law that said, u.s. sanctions, again, it would be u.s. sanctions wouldn't be removed unless iran addresses the iaea's p.m.d. concerns. could you have one -- on another issue, you could have policy of the united states, we
don't accept iran building an , ecessary, uneconomical large, and i emphasize large, they can have some, large centrifuge program after year 13, is when it starts to happen, in a dangerous region of the world. it's just our policy to oppose that. doesn't mean you renegotiate the deal. you just say, look, we're going to oppose that. what does that mean? the country sells a nuclear power plant to iran and china's now, i'm sure russia has been, you say, look, all the fuel has to be provided for that reactor for the lifetime of the reactor. you live -- any motivation for iran to produce the enrich the ewe -- enriched uranium or have an argument to produce the enriched ewe yainl for those reactors, -- enriched uranium for those reactors, you can simply say that a condition of supply is that all the fuel is provided for that reactor, would not be provided indigenously. if iran wants reactors, it will sign that deal. and i can give other examples where you can actually create
policies or actions now that can in a sense mitigate the weaknesses of this deal. lee: omri, did you walen the -- did you want to follow up? among other things i would like to ask you to, politically speaking, what are the mechanisms that you can -- that you think have led to -- i just want to go through one more round and open up to a question or two. what are the political mechanisms or exi generalsies that have led to this moment where we wound up with this agreement, parchin, secret side deal, and how do we avoid it and the future -- in the future? omri: sure. one of the hallmarks of this deby the is that -- debate is it's a more specific version of what mike was talking about, which is, this has not been -- and i suppose a more specific
version of what david's talking about -- this has not been a clean public debate. it -- this has not been a debate -- a lot of this debate has occurred with not just different claims being made but claims that were either in one way or another not binding. the usual way that the risk of oversimplification, the usual way policy proceeds is policymakers lay out their goals, they articulate why they believe that a particular policy has more benefits than costs and then they defend them. but week gone through a two-year pro-- we've gone through a two-year process where the administration repeatedly told lawmakers, please back off. if you give us breathing room we will do things like -- of course the iranian as will be forced to come clean, under secretary sherman, every time they went to the hill, emphasized that. of course inspectors will have to get access to parchin, state department then i think spokeswoman once sarcastically
brushed off a reporter who asked about that and said, i think we would find it very hard to accept an agreement where inspectors didn't have a -- ac have access to parchin. we would shutter fordo. we would get them to dismantle centrifuges. as those commitments to fall by theway side, a number of things happen -- the wayside, a number things happened. the main one was this claim that often was done unblinkingly of, well, we never said that in the first place. of course this got to the level of be a a surrenderity with the any time, anywhere inspections, where secretary kerry said, nobody ever mentioned any time, anywhere to me. and people said, secretary moniz, who is signature next to you, mentioned that. that happened in interviews, it happened during testimony. we haven't had the usual way the public deliberation proceeds which is on the basis of, doesn't have -- listen, nobody's asking and it will never be achieved and actually existing democracies, nobody's asking for absolute facts, absolute honesty. everybody comes to the table as a computer. but the idea that there's no accountability for past
commitments, commitments made to lawmakers, commitments articulated to journalists, commitments developed in public, is a very strange thing, even if you don't assume the doran thesis that there is actually a grand strategy being pursued that involves, if not full blown realignment, then at least talks with iran. even if you don't accept that. from the outside look in it's a very strange debate. but there is reason to believe that that's being pursued. it's not just the right and not just opponents of the deal who have said that what's effectively being negotiated is a talk with iran. the policy chief, i think he's the policy chief, at the pro-iran lobby here in town wrote an article about a month ago that said that israel will find itself completely internationally isolated unless it accepts u.s.-iran encontaminant as foreseen by the deal. so it's a very, very strange debate.
the answer to your question, this is the side deals debate in a macrocosm, the answer is, there need to be more transparency. the corker-cardin legislation s designed to allow a more robust public debate, having facts in hand about what the deal actually does. which is one of the reasons why this side deals issue and why the p.m.d. issue is -- has legs both politically and in a policy sense and in a public affairs sense. it's because just to take these documents that were submitted, congress asked the president to submit documents outlining what actually is in the deal, so they could have this debate in public. the documents that were submitted we now know were either, in some cases full-blown -- fully classified, so, again, the p.m.d.'s issue, right, which was kind of -- people rolled their eyes when this came out. a kind of nonpublic document that says the administration
has concluded we don't need iran to come clean and then it says, and for reason why, see the classified document that's also attached. it made a mockery of that requirement. but we also know more broadly that those documents, and i believe it was the daily beast that reported this, the administration appears to have gone out of its way to mix classified with nonclassified material, into each of the documents they submitted in turn, in order to prevent them from being disclosed publicly. and that undercuts the ability to have a debate and, again, why do you overclassify something? you overclassify something accidentally or because of institutional needs or because risk-rewards indicate you should classify rather than declassify. but a lot of the reasons you classify something is to prevent embarrassment and that appears to have occurred a lot during this debate. lee: mike, would you like to -- then i think i'm going to open it up for a question or two, but would you like to summarize , as it were?
michael: i'll just say that, with respect to what omri just aid, i too have been disturbed by the way that the administration has presented things. on monday in a way that it completely contradicted on tuesday. and then nobody is troubled by it. but i would also add that this has played out and this has since the from the moment out interim deal was signed november 2013. the final agreement that we got was prefigured in the interim agreement. the interim agreement gave the iranians the right to enrich, although that phrase was not in the agreement, it effectively gave them the right to enrich. it also gave them the sunset clause, that this would only be a temporary restriction on the program.